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ABSTRACT
Despite being popularly used in many applications, neural network
models have been found to be vulnerable to adversarial examples,
i.e., carefully crafted examples aiming to mislead machine learning
models. Adversarial examples can pose potential risks on safety and
security critical applications. However, existing defense approaches
are still vulnerable to attacks, especially in a white-box attack sce-
nario. To address this issue, we propose a new defense approach,
namedMulDef, based on robustness diversity. Our approach con-
sists of (1) a general defense framework based on multiple models
and (2) a technique for generating these multiple models to achieve
high defense capability. In particular, given a target model, our
framework includes multiple models (constructed from the target
model) to form a model family. The model family is designed to
achieve robustness diversity (i.e., an adversarial example success-
fully attacking one model cannot succeed in attacking other models
in the family). At runtime, a model is randomly selected from the
family to be applied on each input example. Our general frame-
work can inspire rich future research to construct a desirable model
family achieving higher robustness diversity. Our evaluation re-
sults show thatMulDef (with only up to 5 models in the family)
can substantially improve the target model’s accuracy on adver-
sarial examples by 22–74% in a white-box attack scenario, while
maintaining similar accuracy on legitimate examples.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy; • Computing methodologies → Ma-
chine learning;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Neural networks recently have been used to solve many real-world
tasks such as image recognition and can achieve high effective-
ness on these tasks [7]. However, given a legitimate example that
the model can correctly classify, previous research [16, 17, 19, 20]
proposed various attack approaches to perturb the example by
applying imperceptible modification on the example to fool the
model, i.e., causing the model to misclassify the perturbed example.
We refer to such perturbed example adversarial example and the
model being attacked target model. These attack approaches can be
used in two attack scenarios: (1) white-box attack scenario where
the attackers have complete knowledge about the target model
(and also its defense approaches), and (2) black-box attack scenario
where the attackers do not know anything about the target model
(or its defense approaches), but know the output produced by the
model, given an arbitrary example. We focus on improving the
model against the white-box attack scenario, which is known to be
harder to defend against.
With various effective attack approaches being invented for
the two attack scenarios, a number of defense approaches such
as adversarial training [5, 17] and defensive distillation [21] were
proposed. However, these existing approaches are not really effec-
tive, especially in a white-box attack scenario, facing three main
limitations. (1) Ineffectiveness against re-attack. The improved target
model resulted from some defense approaches such as adversarial
training is still vulnerable to new adversarial examples generated
by reapplying the same attack approach on the improved model
in the white-box attack scenario. These attack approaches rely on
computing the model’s gradient. Even after the defense approach
of adversarial training improves the model with additional adver-
sarial examples in the training set, the attack approaches can still
compute the gradient of the improved model and generate new
adversarial examples. One potentially effective variation of adver-
sarial training includes modification of the loss function used to
optimize the model parameters [19], but that variation requires
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manually changing the target model’s implementation. (2) Inef-
fectiveness to transferable attack. Adversarial examples have the
transferability property: adversarial examples can be used to trans-
fer attacks across models [29]. So attackers can train a substitute
model (which is white-box) for the target model and generate ad-
versarial examples for the substitute model to indirectly attack the
target model [17]. This transferability property can also be used
to attack the target model in a black-box attack scenario [22]. (3)
Bypassable distillation. Even after defensive distillation, attackers
can still compute the gradient of the inputs to the pre-softmax layer
and reduce the magnitude of the inputs to the softmax layer [3].
To address these three main limitations, we propose a new de-
fense approach, namedMulDef, based on robustness diversity. Our
approach consists of (1) a general defense framework based on
multiple models and (2) a technique for generating these multiple
models to achieve high defense capability. The general framework
includes two components: the model generator and runtime model
selector. The design of the general framework is based on the de-
sign principle of diversity. Such diversity among multiple models
introduces uncertainty in the target model [10], making it harder
to attack. We design our general framework based on our main
insight that existing attack approaches attack a single-model ma-
chine learning system by computing the target model’s gradient
based on its loss function.
In particular, the model generator constructs a model family to
assure that an adversarial example generated for one model in the
family cannot fool other models in the family. This model family
can address the limitations of ineffectiveness to re-attack and inef-
fectiveness against transferable attack. To address the limitation of
bypassable distillation, the runtime model selector uses a low-cost
random strategy to select a model in a model family to be applied
on a given example such that the attackers do not know beforehand
which model to compute the gradient even when distillation can
be bypassed. This random strategy is also a burden for the reverse
engineering efforts made by attack approaches. Note that gener-
ally (deterministic) runtime analysis (such as multi-model majority
voting [24, 28]) can be conducted on the given example and all the
models in the family in order to select a model that is likely to be
robust to the example. However, such runtime analysis is costly
and unscalable.
In our general defense framework, the runtime model selector
has to select a model (in the family of diverse models) that is robust
to any given example with a high chance. Thus there are two main
desirable properties of the model family. (1) Legitimate-behavior
preservation. The models in the family shall preserve the same
accuracy on legitimate examples as the target model. (2) Robustness
diversity. Given an adversarial example, the majority of the models
in the family are robust to the example; in this way, even when the
adversarial example is carefully constructed to attack one model in
the family successfully (e.g., in a white-box attack scenario), there
is (N −1)/N chance for randomly choosing from the family another
model robust to the adversarial example, where N is the family size
(i.e., the number of the models in the family). We introduce a new
metric named diversity measurement to measure the robustness
diversity of a model family.
In addition, while aiming to satisfy the preceding two properties,
N , the number of models generated for the family, shall aim to be as
high as possible in order to to increase the defense capability. The
reason is that the chance for randomly choosing the model based
on which the adversarial example is carefully constructed (and thus
likely successful in attacking) is 1/N . The larger the value N is, the
higher the chance of choosing a robust model for a given example
is. However, increasing N can make satisfying the preceding two
properties more challenging.
Our general framework can inspire rich future research (on both
theory and systems) from the research community to construct a
family of as many models as possible given the target model such
that the family satisfies the preceding two properties as much as
possible. There exist some open questions for future research. For
example, given a technique for constructing the family models,
what is the theoretically proven or empirically demonstrated bound
of N , the number of models that can be constructed to satisfy the
two properties? Given a fixed N , what is the theoretically proven
or empirically demonstrated bound of robustness diversity while
achieving the legitimate-behavior preservation?
To demonstrate the benefits of our general framework, our ap-
proach includes a technique for generating these multiple models to
achieve high defense capability. In particular, for the first property
(i.e., legitimate-behavior preservation), our technique constructs
each additional model by using the same architecture and param-
eter configuration as the target model, and the majority of the
training examples are from the original training set to train the
target model. For the second property (i.e., robustness diversity),
the models in the family should be diverse and complementary. To
accomplish so, our technique trains later-constructed models with
some adversarial examples for the earlier-constructed models.
In summary, this paper makes the following main contributions:
• A general defense framework based onmultiple models (with
high robustness diversity) constructed from the target model.
• A novel technique for generating these multiple models to
achieve high defense capability.
• Evaluation results on three attack approaches (Fast Gradient
Sign Method [19], Carlini & Wagner attack [17], Projected
Gradient Descent [13]) for showing substantial benefits of
our general framework instantiated with the technique for
improving defense capability.
The evaluation results show that our defense approach substan-
tially improves the robustness of the target model (on MNIST [11]
and CIFAR-10 [8] datasets) in the case of a white-box attack sce-
nario, and slightly improves the target model in the case of a black-
box attack scenario. We implement MulDef in a tool and conduct
all the evaluations in Python 3.0. We use TensorFlow 1.8.0 [6] for
the machine learning computation and Keras (the Python Deep
Learning library version 2.1.6) [4] for neural networks. All the
implementations can be found on the project website1.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we illustrate the terminology and basic attacks and
defense approaches in previous work.
1Project website: URL anonymized due to double blind submission
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2.1 Legitimate vs. Adversarial Examples
We focus on addressing adversarial example attacks on neural net-
work models for classification tasks. A legitimate example x is an
example that occurs naturally [14] for the classification task. For
example, if a classification task is to classify digits, legitimate ex-
amples can be images of real digits without other elements. An
adversarial example [30] x ′ is an example similar to a legitimate
example with imperceptible changes (of the legitimate example)
that can change the target model’s prediction on the example.
2.2 Existing Attack Approaches
An attack approach takes a legitimate example and then tries to
generate an adversarial example similar to the legitimate example.
Thus in our evaluation setup (Section 5), we control each attack
configuration to generate only an adversarial example within a
certain distance from the given legitimate example in order to
avoid human effort to label the adversarial example.
We evaluate our proposed defense approach against major exist-
ing attack approaches as described below.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). FGSM [5] generates adver-
sarial examples iteratively. Let l be the ground-truth label of x . Let
J (x , l) be the loss function of classifying x as label l . For each pixel,
FGSM updates the pixel according to the sign of the gradient of the
loss function at the pixel. Formally, FGSM iteratively modifies x as
follows:
x ′ = x + ϵ · sign(∇x J (x , l))
Carlini & Wagner attack (C&W). C&W [17] generates adver-
sarial examples with small perturbation δ through the following
optimization
δ = argmin
δ ′
D(x ,x + δ ′) + c · f (x + δ ′)
where D is a distance metric, which can be L0 (# of nonzero ele-
ments), L2 (euclidean distance), or L∞ (largest magnitude among
each element), c is a constant to balance constraints, and a logit-
based objective function f (·) is designed in such a way that f (x ′) ≤
0 if and only if the classifier misclassifies x ′, indicating that the
attack succeeds. Such logic-based objective function enables C&W
to generate adversarial examples robust against the defensive dis-
tillation [21].
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). PGD [13] is similar to FGSM,
but more powerful. PGD is an iterative variant of FGSM. In each
iteration, PGD updates the example as follows:
x ′i+1 = π {FGSM(x ′i )}
where π is a clip function to keep x ′i+1 within a defined perturbation
range.
There are different threat levels of adversarial attack, categorized
by the amount of attackers’ knowledge and their goal [23]. In a
white-box attack scenario, the attackers have complete knowledge
of the target model. The attackers’ goal is misclassification, altering
the output classification to any class different from the original class.
A black-box attack scenario has the same goal, but less knowledge.
The attackers have access to only the oracle.
We focus on the white-box attack scenario; however, our evalua-
tion also includes the black-box attack scenario.
2.3 Existing Defense Approaches
We next describe two main existing defense approaches proposed
in previous work.
Adversarial training. The idea of adversarial training [5, 17] is to
make the target model more general and have some exposure to ad-
versarial examples. A straightforward way is to augment the train-
ing set by replacing some training samples with the corresponding
adversarial examples generated by an attack approach [15]. Also,
one can train the model using an adversarial objective function to
improve the robustness and generality of a classifier [13]. Adver-
sarial examples can also be crafted from pre-trained models (e.g.,
ones from Ensemble Adversarial Training) [32].
Defensive distillation. Some attack approaches rely on optimiz-
ing an objective function by computing the gradient of the target
model. Thus it would be useful for a defender to hide the gradient
of the target model. Defensive distillation [21] trains a classifier
to cause a rapid reduction of its gradient over an input, resulting
in that an attacker can hardly perform an attack requiring com-
puting gradients. Defensive distillation hides the gradient between
the pre-softmax layer and softmax outputs by using distillation
training.
Some other existing defense approaches address the problem in
different ways. First, they detect whether an example is adversarial
by training a model detector [12]. Second, they reform the detected
adversarial example to a legitimate example [14] or classify the
adversarial example by a highly nonlinear model [9].
In general, existing defense approaches extend the target model
in various ways. Some approaches improve the target model against
adversarial examples by modifying the weights and parameters of
the target model. Some approaches [14] do not modify the target
model at all, but detect and modify adversarial examples before
passing them to the target model. Our proposed MulDef approach
does not modify the target model or adversarial examples. We
evaluate ourMulDef approach on the following two metrics.
• Test accuracy (TestAcc): the accuracy on a legitimate ex-
ample in the test set.
• Adversarial accuracy (AdvAcc): the accuracy on an adver-
sarial example generated by an attack approach. The label of
an adversarial example is the label of the legitimate example
used to generate that adversarial example.
3 OURMULDEF APPROACH
We design ourMulDef approach for improving a neural network
model to invalidate the reverse engineering efforts made by attack
approaches. The design of theMulDef approach is based on the
design principle of diversity. Diversity achieved by randomly se-
lecting a model from a family of models introduces uncertainty in
the target under defense.
The MulDef approach includes a general defense framework as
shown in Figure 1. The framework consists of two components: (1)
the model generator and (2) the runtime model selector. The two
components work together to improve the target model’s effective-
ness on adversarial examples. As described in Section 1, the model
generator aims to produce a model family for achieving the two
properties: (1) legitimate-behavior preservation and (2) robustness
diversity. In addition, we aim to have as many models as possible
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Figure 1: Our general defense framework. Model generator
constructs p similar models to T : M1,M2, . . . ,Mp . Given an
input example x , MulDef randomly selects one model to
compute the class label for x .
to increase the chance that the runtime model selector ends up
selecting a robust model for any given example.
First, let us formulate the problem. Given a target model T , we
construct a model family (consisting of T ,M1,M2, . . . ,Mp ) that
achieves the following objectives:
(1) The difference between the lowest test accuracy of the mod-
els in the family and the test accuracy of T as formulated
below shall be minimized:
|min{TestAcc(M1), . . . ,TestAcc(Mp )} −TestAcc(T )|
(2) For a given adversarial example x , the total number ofmodels
(in the family) successfully attacked by x shall be minimized.
(3) The family size p shall be maximized.
By trying to achieve all three objectives together, we may con-
front a situation similar to the space-time tradeoff. When we gen-
erate many models (increasing p), those models should be diverse
enough such that the majority of them are not successfully attacked
by the same adversarial example. Moreover, they cannot be too di-
verse as we need to achieve the legitimate-behavior preservation.
Our idea exploration in solving this problem suggests that we may
focus only on achieving the first two objectives and then we can
keep increasing more models as long as we do not compromise
(much) the first two objectives.
In the rest of this section, we first introduce a new metric, diver-
sity measurement (Section 3.1), for the second objective, to measure
the majority-model robustness. Then we explain the two compo-
nents in our general framework along with empirical exploration
on design choices for our model-generation technique (Section 3.2).
3.1 Diversity Measurement
We measure the diversity of the model family based on the robust-
ness of majority of models against adversarial examples generated
targeting on one of the models. The detailed steps are as follows:
(1) generate adversarial examples for each model in the family; (2)
for each generated example i , count the number of models that the
example can successfully attack, denoted as si ; (3) plot the distribu-
tion of si , i.e., the number of models that each example successfully
attacks. The diversity of the model family can be calculated as
1 −
∑
i si
a×n , where a is the number of adversarial examples and n is
the size of the model family. Informally if most examples success-
fully attack fewer models in the family (low si ), the model family
is more diverse (close to 1).
3.2 General Defense Framework and
Model-Generation Technique
According to Figure 1, given a target model, the model generator
constructs a family of models. Models in the family (except the
target model) are trained with additional adversarial examples from
the specified attack approach. Note that the specified attack ap-
proach used to train the adversarial examples do not need to be the
same as the attack approach that we are defending against.
3.2.1 Model Generator and Model-Generation Technique. To gen-
erate other additional models in the family, we initially start with
the simple idea of adversarial training [5, 17]. In particular, given
a target model T , we initially construct only one additional model
M1 that has the same architecture and parameter setting asT . How-
ever, M1 is trained with an augmented dataset (the training set
plus some adversarial examples for T ). Note that the adversarial
examples are generated in the white-box attack scenario. LetAdvMi
denote the set of adversarial examples forMi and AdvT denote the
set of adversarial examples (generated by the specified attack ap-
proach in the white-box attack scenario) for the target modelT . We
notice thatM1 performs better on the adversarial examples for T
(AdvT ), butM1 still performs worse on its own adversarial examples
(AdvM1 ). In fact, augmenting the training set cannot really improve
the model against adversarial attacks. Next, we construct more mod-
els,M1,M2,M3, . . . ,Mp , where p denotes the number of additional
models. The next question is how to trainM2,M3, . . . ,Mp .
For our model-generation technique, we devise the following
two mechanisms to create the training set for each model:
• Solution 1. The training set of Mi is constructed as the
union of the original training set and the adversarial exam-
ples generated for the previously constructedmodelAdvMi−1 .
• Solution 2. The training set of Mi is constructed as the
union of the original training set and the adversarial exam-
ples generated for each of all the previously constructed
models AdvT ,AdvM1 ,AdvM2 , . . . ,AdvMi−1 .
To compare the two solutions, we measure the diversity of two
families of models (with the family size chosen as 5), each of which
is constructed by using the two proposed solutions. We find that
a model family constructed by Solution 2 performs better than
that constructed by Solution 1. Figure 2 shows the diversity mea-
surement of the two model families. In Solution 1, the majority of
the adversarial examples successfully attack 2 to 3 models. How-
ever, the majority of the adversarial examples successfully attack
at most one model in Solution 2. Our experimental results also
confirm that the model family constructed by Solution 2 has a
higher accuracy.
One observation to explain such results is that in the first solu-
tion, AdvM2 may not be representative for AdvM1 . SoM3 (trained
with the union of the original training set and AdvM2 ) can still
be vulnerable to AdvM1 . In the second solution, we trainM3 with
the union of the original training set and AdvT ,AdvM1 ,AdvM2 to
makeM3 more robust against all the previously constructed models’
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Figure 2: Boxplot comparison of the diversity measurement
of two model families constructed by Solution 1 and Solu-
tion 2. Each red dot represents the mean.
Figure 3: Comparison of the two solutions of augmenting
the training set for constructing additional models.
adversarial examples. Thus, we implementMulDef by following
the second solution. It is worth noting that the last model, which
is trained with all the other models’ adversarial examples, seems
to be more robust than other models. However, the reason that we
still include other models in our defense is that the last model is
vulnerable to its own adversarial set (AdvM3 ), and all the models in
the family could be complementary to each other.
Figure 3 illustrates the idea of having multiple models and why
Solution 2 performs better than Solution 1. Let the rectangle in
each solution represent the set of all adversarial examples for the
target model (AdvT ⊂ S) under a given attack approach. This set
can be infinite.MulDef incrementally constructs additional models
one by one. First, MulDef constructsM1 aiming to defend against
a subset of AdvT by trainingM1 with some adversarial examples
for T . The circle for M1 covers the subset of AdvT that M1 can
defend. MulDef keeps constructing more models to cover more
space in the rectangle, indicating thatMulDef is getting more ro-
bust to adversarial examples. Intuitively, MulDef performs well
when many of the constructed models cover a large portion of the
rectangle. The difference between Solution 1 and Solution 2 is
thatMulDef trainsM3 with the union of the original training set
and AdvT ,AdvM2 in Solution 1, but trains M3 with the union of
the original training set and AdvT ,AdvM1 ,AdvM2 in Solution 2.
Thus, M3 in Solution 2 is likely able to defend against adversar-
ial examples for M1, resulting in having a higher chance that a
given adversarial example can be defended by all the three models
(M1,M2,M3). According to Figure 3, a given adversarial example
x can be defended by onlyM1 andM2 in Solution 1. However, x
can be defended by all the three models in Solution 2. A higher
number of additional models that are robust to x results in a higher
chance thatMulDef selects a right model at runtime.
(a) AdvAcc of target modelT when its training set
is augmented with different quantities of adver-
sarial examples.
(b) AdvAcc of model D (on AdvT ) when its train-
ing set is augmented with different quantities of
Adv ′T .
Figure 4: Results of using adversarial training against FGSM
white-box attack for both datasets.
3.2.2 Runtime Model Selector. To combine multiple models to-
gether, MulDef randomly selects a model from the family of mod-
elsT ,M1,M2,M3, . . . ,Mp to compute the class label for each given
input example. The intuition of this strategy is to be able to in-
troduce uncertainty in the target model (by the design principle
of diversity) within the family of models so that it is hard for the
attackers to generate adversarial examples that can attack all or
most of the models. Moreover, this runtime model selector acts as
a wall to hide the gradient of a single model, because the attackers
do not know in advance which modelMulDef ends up selecting at
runtime. This random strategy shares the same spirit of defensive
distillation [21], which attempts to hide the gradient of the target
model.
3.2.3 Empirical Exploration on Design Choices. Before settling
down on our approach, we also conduct some experiments to see
whether using only adversarial training can make the target model
more robust against adversarial examples. We create two convolu-
tional neural network models that can achieve about 99.13%/80.4%
test accuracy (on the test set) for both MNIST and CIFAR-10. Then
we use FGSM to attack the model in the white-box attack scenario.
Without adversarial training, the model has about 8.87%/13.79%
adversarial accuracy against FGSM for MNIST/CIFAR-10. Then we
try augmenting the training set with adversarial examples (gen-
erated by FGSM) to see whether the model is more robust. Note
that we run the experiment three times and report the average
accuracy. Figure 4a shows that augmenting adversarial examples
for both datasets can even worsen the model: the more adversarial
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examples we augment, the lower adversarial accuracy the model
achieves. According to Figure 4a, the adversarial accuracy of target
model T for MNIST/CIFAR-10 surprisingly goes down to under
2.50%/13.00% when we augment the training set with more than
50% of the original training set’s size.
How about we construct another model D that is robust to the
target model’s adversarial examples (AdvT )? Thus, we try to con-
struct a new model D with the same architecture as T , and train
D with the original training set augmented with a different set of
adversarial examples forT (Adv ′T ) to see how D performs on AdvT .
The results in Figure 4b show that the adversarial accuracy of model
D on AdvT is higher when we augment more adversarial examples
especially in the beginning for both datasets. Then the adversar-
ial accuracy converges to around 97%/74% for MNIST/CIFAR-10.
Notice that the adversarial accuracy does not significantly change
when we augment more than around 15% and 25% of adversarial
examples for MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively. So we decide that
in our MulDef approach, we construct other models by using 15%
and 25% of adversarial examples to augment the training set for
MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively.
Onemaywonder whywe decide to augment the training set with
adversarial examples. We can also use only adversarial examples
for T to train other additional models. If we use only adversarial
examples to train other additional models, the additional models
will perform worse on legitimate examples (in the test set), not
being desirable.
According to the preceding observation, simply retraining the
target model with adversarial examples cannot significantly make
the model more robust against future adversarial examples as the
attack approach also knows everything about the retrained target
model. However, having multiple models helps as an adversarial
example for one model may not be able to fool another model. The
runtime model selector helps combine multiple models together.
We use the random selection strategy because it is simple, low-cost,
and provides some probabilistic guarantee thatMulDef will not
likely select a model that is vulnerable to a given adversarial ex-
ample when we have many models. Our evaluation (described in
the next two sections) includes experiments to investigate on how
many additional models our model-generation technique can gen-
erate while achieving legitimate-behavior preservation and robust
diversity.
4 EVALUATION SETUP
We discuss the datasets used to evaluate ourMulDef defense ap-
proach, against the three existing attack approaches. Note that we
run all the evaluations three times and report the average accuracy
to reduce chance of accidental observations.
Datasets. We conduct our evaluations on two public datasets:
MNIST and CIFAR-10 (described in Section 2).
Target model.We create two different convolutional neural net-
work models for the two datasets (MNIST and CIFAR-10) as follows:
• MNIST: We follow the previous study on FGSM [19] and use
the same model in the study to evaluate FGSM with MNIST.
The model mainly consists of three convolutional layers
with 64 neurons for each layer and ReLU as the activation
function, and a densely-connected layer of 10 neurons for
each digit.
• CIFAR-10: We slightly adjust the model for CIFAR-10 in the
study by C&W [17]. The model mainly consists of four con-
volutional layers with 64 neurons for the first two layers, 128
neurons for the next two layers, and ReLU as their activation
function, two densely-connected layers of 256 neurons, and
a densely-connected layer of 10 neurons for each class. The
only difference is that we add dropouts in both the convo-
lutional layers and densely-connected layers. We also add
l2-norm regularization in the first two densely-connected
layers.
We set the max epoch equal to 10 for the MNISTmodel and 50 for
the CIFAR-10 model. Two training processes both adopt the early
stopping technique used to avoid overfitting. The technique stops
the training process when the validation loss fails to reduce by at
least 0.001 for 5 epochs. The target model achieves 98–99%/76–80%
test accuracy for MNIST/CIFAR-10.
Attack approaches. To check whether a model outputs a correct
label for an adversarial example generated by an attack approach,
we need to set the parameters of the attack approach to constrain
the amount of perturbation on legitimate examples, so that we can
use the original label as the ground truth.
In FGSM, the degree of perturbation is controlled by the param-
eter eps. We set eps to be 0.3/0.05 for MNIST/CIFAR-10 for both
white-box and black-box scenarios.
In C&W, the degree of perturbation is controlled by the pa-
rameter confidence. We set this value to 0.01 for both MNIST and
CIFAR-10 in the white-box attack scenario. In order to enhance
the black-box attack, we increase this value to 30 for both MNIST
and CIFAR-10. Another parameter named max_iterations is used
to control the max number of iterations for generating adversar-
ial examples. We set max_iterations to 1000 for both MNIST and
CIFAR-10 because this value is high enough to generate adversarial
examples for reducing the target model’s accuracy to 0%. Other
parameters in C&W are set as their default values.
In PGD, we set the parameter eps the same as in the FGSM
experiments because the PGD approach is built on top of FGSM.
We reduce eps_iter to 0.01 from its default value 0.05, since we set
eps to 0.05 for CIFAR-10. We also increase nb_iter to 30 from its
default value 10 for CIFAR-10.
MulDef setup.There are twomain parameters to configureMulDef:
(1) the percentage of adversarial examples augmented to the train-
ing set, and (2) the number of additional models to be constructed.
As discussed in Section 3, we select 15%/25% as the percentage of
augmented adversarial examples for MNIST/CIFAR-10. To explore
an optimal number of additional models, we set the number of
additional models to be 1, 2, 3, and 4. Thus in total, MulDef has at
most 5 models including the target model.
5 EVALUATION RESULTS
We measure the effectiveness of MulDef against FGSM, C&W, and
PGD in the white-box and black-box attack scenarios using two
datasets: MNIST and CIFAR-10.
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Figure 5: Adversarial accuracy of MulDef against C&W on
different sets of adversarial examples for MNIST.
5.1 Effectiveness of MulDef in White-box
Attack Scenario
To evaluate our approach in the white-box attack scenario, we
perform two types of attacks toMulDef:
(1) Non-adaptive Attack. BecauseMulDef constructs a fam-
ily of models: T ,M1,M2, . . . , we can try the three attacks
(FGSM, C&W, and PGD) in a divide-and-conquer fashion
by attacking each model separately to come up with the
strongest adversarial examples forMulDef.
(2) Adaptive Attack. Defending against non-adaptive attacks
is necessary but not sufficient. Thus, we introduce two adap-
tive attacks built on top of FGSM and PGD.
Effectiveness ofMulDefunderNon-adaptiveAttack. For non-
adaptive attack, we generate a set of adversarial examples by using
the existing attacks for each model in the model family to find the
strongest adversarial set (the one with the highest attack success
rate). We measure the adversarial accuracies of MulDef along with
each model in the model family against all sets of adversarial ex-
amples. The adversarial accuracy of MulDef that we report is the
lowest one (which is based on the strongest possible adversary)
among all models. The median adversarial L∞ distance from FGSM
and PGD attacks for MNIST/CIFAR-10 is 0.3/0.05. The median ad-
versarial L2 distances for C&W+MNIST, C&W+CIFAR-10 are 1.829
and 0.1823, respectively.
Figures 5 and 6 show the adversarial accuracy of the target
model T (MulDef with only one model – the target model) and
the adversarial accuracy of MulDef (with 2, 3, 4, and 5 models)
on different sets of adversarial examples (AdvT ,AdvM1 , . . . ,AdvM4
denoted as different colored bars). Due to space limit, we show the
figures of results only for CW (the state-of-the-art attack).
The figures show that the more modelsMulDef has in the family,
the higher adversarial accuracyMulDef gains. Here we present the
case only when MulDef has 5 models. The results for the other at-
tacks also follow the same trend. In summary, the adversarial ac-
curacies in FGSM+MNIST, FGSM+CIFAR-10, C&W+MNIST,
C&W+CIFAR-10, PGD+MNIST, andPGD+CIFAR-10 are 64.12%,
49.99%, 78.61%, 60.52%, 73.51%, 55.91%, respectively, whereas
the target model (without any defense) has 11.46%, 14.47%,
Figure 6: Adversarial accuracy of MulDef against C&W on
different sets of adversarial examples for CIFAR-10.
Table 1: Comparison of the adversarial accuracy of MulDef
against Non-adaptive attack, Adaptive Attack, and Gradient
Obfuscation for MNIST and CIFAR-10.
Datasets Non-adaptive Adaptive GradientFGSM PGD FGSM PGD Obfuscation
MNIST 64.12% 73.51% 65.30% 22.40% 48.31%
CIFAR-10 49.99% 55.91% 35.27% 22.69% 35.30%
0.00%, 2.09%, 0.01%, and 15.20% adversarial accuracy for those
setups, respectively. These results indicate thatMulDef can suc-
cessfully defend Non-adaptive Attack.
In addition, we also compare ourMulDef approach with some
existing defense approaches. The adversarially trained network
proposed by Madry et al. [13] has improved the adversarial ac-
curacy over 90% for MNIST against PGD, outperforming our ap-
proach. However, for CIFAR-10, their approach and our approach
have about the same accuracy of around 50–60%, but we use a
higher eps (0.05 vs. 0.03). Na et al. [31] proposed another kind of
adversarial training, cascade adversarial training, which transfers
the knowledge of the end results of adversarial training. Their ap-
proach performs better for MNIST as their approach can reach the
adversarial accuracy of 81–97%. Our approach performs better for
CIFAR-10 as their approach reaches only the accuracy of 27–38%.
We suspect that for complex images like CIFAR-10, our approach
can outperform the existing defense approaches.
Effectiveness of MulDef under Adaptive Attack. To exten-
sively evaluate our MulDef approach, we develop two adaptive
attacks built upon FGSM and PGD. These two adaptive attacks are
designed specifically to attack our approach. Because our approach
randomly selects a model to predict for a given example, we can
improve FGSM and PGD (which are made for attacking a single
model) to consider all the models in the model family during their
generation of adversarial examples. Instead of maximizing the loss
function of a single model (Section 2), we maximize the sum of all
the loss functions as follows:
x ′ = x + ϵ · sign(∇x
∑
i
Ji (x , l))
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Table 2: Adversarial accuracies of MulDef built on FGSM
and C&W adversarial examples against FGSM and C&W
white-box attacks. Cross-attack results are marked in bold.
Attacks Tgt model
MulDef
FGSM adv
exps
C&W adv
exps
FGSM
MNIST 11.46% 64.12% 14.96%
CIFAR-10 14.47% 49.99% 26.47%
C&W
MNIST 00.00% 69.19% 49.44%
CIFAR-10 00.00% 61.25% 60.45%
where Ji is the loss function of each model i in the model family.
We conduct experiments on ourMulDef approach with 5 models
for both MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. We also test our adaptive
attack when the size of the perturbation is unbounded (setting the
eps to be 1.0 for MNIST), and the adaptive attack built upon PGD
can reach about 97% attack success rate (i.e.,MulDef has only 3%
accuracy). Thus, this adaptive attack is effective enough. Table 1
shows the adversarial accuracy of MulDef against adaptive FGSM
and adaptive PGD. We can see that MulDef has relatively low
adversarial accuracy against Adaptive Attack, but it still provides
substantial defense for the target model. We also compare MulDef
with a baseline attack approach presented in previous work about
the gradient obfuscation attack [1], which is used to attack stochas-
tic gradients in randomized defenses. Compared with this baseline
attack approach, MulDef achieves higher accuracy against Gra-
dient Obfuscation, denoted as the last column in Table 1. For all
the adaptive attacks (including Gradient Obfuscation), the median
adversarial L∞ distance for MNIST/CIFAR-10 is 0.3/0.05.
5.2 Cross-Attack Scenario
In the white-box attack scenario, we construct models inMulDef to
defend against one attack approach by using adversarial examples
generated based on the same attack approach. We see thatMulDef
performs very well. Thus, isMulDef attack-dependent? Realisti-
cally, we cannot know in advance which white-box attack approach
the attackers will use in reality, indicating that we cannot construct
models in MulDef based on the adversarial examples generated
by the approach to be used by the attackers. Therefore, we further
investigate the robustness of our approach in the cross-attack sce-
nario, in which we launch one attack approach (e.g., C&W) to test
MulDef built on top of adversarial examples of a different attack
approach (e.g., FGSM).
Table 2 shows that no matter which group of adversarial exam-
ples MulDef uses to construct models, MulDef performs better
than the target model. Surprisingly, we find that when being at-
tacked by C&W, MulDef built on FGSM adversarial examples is
more robust than it built on C&W adversarial examples. Note that
it does not necessarily suggest that FGSM attack is always more
powerful than C&W but instead suggests that FGSM adversarial
examples are more suitable than C&W ones to construct diversified
models inMulDef.
We further measure the diversity of model families inMulDef
(defined in Section 3.1) built on FGSM adversarial examples for
both datasets. In diversity measurement, we use adversarial exam-
ples generated with both FGSM and C&W attacks. Figure 7 shows
Figure 7: Comparison of the diversity measurement of four
model families against FGSM and C&W for MNIST and
CIFAR-10. Each red dot represents the mean.
Table 3: Test accuracy of eachmodel inMulDefwith 5mod-
els: T (target model),M1,M2,M3,M4.
Attack / dataset Test acc of each model (%)
T M1 M2 M3 M4
FGSM / MNIST 99.03 98.65 98.90 98.91 98.93
FGSM / CIFAR-10 79.78 76.58 76.89 76.46 76.69
C&W / MNIST 98.98 99.10 99.04 99.04 99.05
C&W / CIFAR-10 77.52 76.64 76.29 75.34 75.83
PGD / MNIST 99.24 99.10 98.99 99.01 98.97
PGD / CIFAR-10 76.20 73.90 72.41 72.72 71.50
the distribution of adversarial examples by the number of models
that each example successfully attacks in four model families (each
model family containing five models). We observe that although
previous results suggest that MulDef built on FGSM examples
is more effective, the diversity of the model family for CIFAR-10
(CIFAR-10/FGSM) is not very high (1 − 2.475 = 0.51). The average
number of models that can be attacked in the model family is 2.47.
One possible reason is that the data in CIFAR-10 have high dimen-
sions (RGB images with a lager number of pixels). Small changes
in each dimension would enable the adversarial examples to be
adapted to the diverse models. Model families trained for MNIST
present more robustness diversity than model families trained for
CIFAR-10.
5.3 Effectiveness of MulDef on Original Test
Dataset
While achieving higher adversarial accuracy,MulDef also main-
tains about the same test accuracy as the target model. Table 3
shows that in each model family, the additional models have about
the same test accuracy as the target model. Overall, against FGSM,
MulDef for MNIST/CIFAR-10 has 98.91%/77.13% test accuracy com-
pared to 99.03%/79.78% (the target model’s test accuracy in column
T). Against C&W,MulDef for MNIST/CIFAR-10 has 98.79%/80.05%
test accuracy compared to 98.58%/80.41%. Against PGD,MulDef
for MNIST/CIFAR-10 has 99.03%/73.18% test accuracy compared
to 99.24%/76.20%. These results show thatMulDef can maintain
similar accuracy on testing examples (the original test dataset).
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Figure 8: Adversarial accuracy of MulDef with different
numbers of models based on Non-adaptive Attack.
5.4 Impact of Different Numbers of Models
Figures 5 and 6 show that having more models inMulDef can in-
crease adversarial accuracies. Surprisingly, eachmodel canmaintain
about the same test accuracy as the target model’s. One may have
the concern that when we generate more models, the last model
may have lower test accuracy than the others, because the last
model is constructed by the most adversarial examples augmented
to its training set. It turns out that those adversarial examples do not
have a negative impact or confuse the model when the model faces
against legitimate examples. This result suggests that having more
models could make the classifier more robust against adversarial
examples.
Statistically, having more models increases the chance of select-
ing a robust model for each given input example at runtime. This
assumption is true only when additional models are complementary
to the existing models. In other words, the diversity of the model
family is increasing. Thus we additionally evaluate our approach
when using more models. Figure 8 shows the white-box adversarial
accuracy of MulDef. The adversarial accuracies converge when
using 7–10 models. The result implies that at some point, adding
more models does not increase robustness diversity. Ideally, it is bet-
ter to have more models to improve robustness diversity. So these
results open more future research directions on how to improve the
model generator to be more effective in generating complementary
models.
5.5 Impact of Adversarial Training and
Randomization inMulDef
Based on the idea of adversarial training, the model generator
in MulDef constructs each additional model one after another,
whereMi is trained with the union of the original training set and
AdvT ,AdvM1 ,AdvM2 , . . . ,AdvMi−1 . In other words, for AdvMi , all
the other models constructed afterMi are trained with the training
set that includes AdvMi . Therefore, most models constructed after
Mi should be robust to AdvMi . To test this hypothesis, we measure
the average adversarial accuracy (on AdvMi ) of all the models con-
structed afterMi , denoted as the third accuracy in Table 4. We can
see that the third accuracy is often the highest as expected. There
are a few cases that the third accuracy is not the highest but is
similar to the second accuracy for C&W / CIFAR-10. We inspect
these cases and find that the third, fourth, and fifth models are
not more resilient than the second model in the family, indicating
that only two models in the family already reach the saturation
point of adversarial accuracy. Thus, we would need to improve
the model construction in our approach in order to reach higher
adversarial accuracy for C&W / CIFAR-10. Note that the cells in
the last column in Table 4 are missing the third accuracy, because
M4 is the last model in the family.
In order to select a robust model by the runtime model selector
with a high chance, most models constructed beforeMi should be
robust to AdvMi as well. Thus, we measure the average accuracy
of all the models constructed before Mi on AdvMi , denoted as
the second accuracy in Table 4. Our result shows that the second
accuracy is also relatively high compared to the accuracy ofMi on
AdvMi (denoted as the first accuracy in the table). This result raises
a question on why most models constructed beforeMi can achieve
higher accuracy on AdvMi , even though they are not exposed to
AdvMi at all during their training process. One possible reason is
that AdvMi is very specific toMi , especially for C&W adversarial
examples. And every new model constructed is trained with more
adversarial examples, causing the later constructed models to be
different from previously constructed models.
5.6 Effectiveness of MulDef in Black-box
Attack Scenario
For the black-box attack scenario where the attackers can access
only the target model output, we first train a substitute model
with synthetic inputs selected by a Jacobian-based heuristic [20]
to approximate the target model’s decision boundaries. We use
150 hold-out images from the test set and run 5 Jacobian-based
augmentation epochs, and set the augmentation parameter λ = 0.1.
All of these parameters are default values. Then we apply white-box
attacks on the substitute model to generate adversarial examples
and evaluate the target model on those examples.
Table 5 shows thatMulDef still achieves higher adversarial accu-
racy than the target model in the black-box attack scenario except
when C&W and CIFAR-10 are used. Reasons that our defense does
not substantially improve the target model in the black-box attack
scenario might be the transferability property of adversarial exam-
ples or the fact that black-box attack approaches are not powerful
enough to reveal weakness in the target model.
6 DISCUSSION
In our experiments, we also try a number of different target models
for MNIST. Most of them achieve about the same accuracy around
98–99%; however, we notice that some of the target models are
more robust than the others as they can weaken the transferability
property of the adversarial examples. We find that if we use a more
robust target model, our defense system can achieve substantially
higher adversarial accuracy.
We choose the random strategy for runtime model selector to
achieve low cost and introduce uncertainty in the target model.
Nevertheless, there can be another strategy based on multiple-
model/implementation majority voting [25, 28], which we plan to
explore in future work. In particular, Srisakaokul et al. [28] use
multiple-implementation testing to test an implementation of a
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Table 4: Three adversarial accuracies on a set of adversarial examples generated for each model in MulDef with 5 models
(T ,M1,M2,M3,M4) against an attack approach and a dataset. For the set of adversarial examples for model x (Advx ), (1) the first
accuracy denotes the accuracy of model x on Advx , (2) the second accuracy denotes the average accuracy of all the models
constructed (by MulDef) before model x on Advx , and (3) the third accuracy denotes the average accuracy of all the mod-
els constructed (by MulDef) after model x on Advx . Note that MulDef constructs M1,M2,M3, and M4 in order. The highest
accuracy among the three is in bold.
Atk / dataset Adversarial accuracies on adversarial examples
AdvT AdvM1 AdvM2 AdvM3 AdvM4
FGSM / MNIST 11.46% / - / 95.40% 01.94% / 54.42% / 95.93% 04.10% / 66.78% / 95.74% 04.10% / 76.34% / 96.48% 04.73% / 80.54% / -
FGSM / CIFAR-10 14.47% / - / 61.08% 14.62% / 57.10% / 65.29% 13.71% / 63.01% / 68.43% 19.27% / 59.75% / 68.49% 20.85% / 57.46% / -
C&W / MNIST 00.00% / - / 98.57% 00.00% / 98.18% / 98.58% 00.00% / 98.32% / 98.67% 00.00% / 98.03% / 98.75% 00.00% / 98.07% / -
C&W / CIFAR-10 02.09% / - / 74.58% 03.33% / 75.47% / 74.50% 03.53% / 75.72% / 74.57% 05.54% / 75.32% / 74.73% 07.55% / 74.94% / -
PGD / MNIST 00.01% / - / 97.03% 00.00% / 94.72% / 97.46% 00.04% / 92.85% / 97.16% 00.55% / 91.74% / 96.54% 00.71% / 91.64% / -
PGD / CIFAR-10 15.20% / - / 65.81% 15.06% / 65.37% / 66.18% 17.92% / 65.93% / 66.49% 18.71% / 66.96% / 67.01% 16.63% / 66.63% / -
Table 5: Comparison of adversarial accuracy of the target
model andMulDef in the black-box attack scenario.
Attacks Black-box
Tgt model MulDef
FGSM MNIST 70.19% 81.76%
CIFAR-10 70.32% 72.82%
C&W MNIST 72.10% 78.89%
CIFAR-10 70.71% 65.28%
machine learning algorithm, where the majority output across mul-
tiple implementations of the same algorithm is used as a test oracle.
MulDef also contains multiple models that are robust to a given
adversarial example, so we may be able to use the majority label
across multiple models as an output, instead of randomly selecting
one model to be applied on the given example at runtime. However,
as discussed in Section 1, such strategy can be costly, needing to ap-
ply all models in the family to the given example. In addition, with
a candidate adversarial example, the attackers can also simulate
such strategy of multi-model majority voting ahead of time and
know beforehand which model in the family to (re-)compute the
gradient to improve the candidate adversarial example if needed.
7 RELATEDWORK
A variety of approaches have been proposed for defending against
adversarial examples. Meng et al. [14] proposed a defense approach
named MagNet against adversarial examples. MagNet consists of
two main steps: detect and reform. LikeMulDef, MagNet does not
modify the target model. MagNet first detects whether a given input
example is adversarial by measuring the distance between the input
example and the manifold of legitimate examples in the training
set. If the input example is farther to the manifold of the legitimate
examples, the input example is marked as an adversarial exam-
ple and then gets reformed/reconstructed to be close to legitimate
examples. Their ideas are different from our MulDef approach, be-
causeMulDef does not reform the given example. Instead,MulDef
trains more models to handle any example. MagNet can perform
well in a gray-box attack scenario (where the attackers know about
the target model and the defense, but not the parameters of the
defense), but cannot handle a white-box attack scenario at all. In
fact, MagNet achieves only less than 20%/40% adversarial accuracy
against FGSM/C&W attack (in the white-box attack scenario) for
MNIST [26]. So our approach outperforms MagNet.
Xu et al. [33] proposed an approach to detect an adversarial
example by “squeezing” out unnecessary input features. Then the
approach compares the model’s prediction on the original example
with its prediction on the squeezed example. If the predictions are
substantially different, the original example is likely to be adver-
sarial. However, their approach does not produce any output if the
given input is adversarial.
Rouhani et al. [2] proposed an approach of using complementary
but disjoint modular redundancies to defend against adversarial
examples. Although Rouhani et al. claim their approach to be attack-
independent, it still requires a lot of pre-constructedmodules, which
are needed to be trained with different attack algorithms. Their
approach only guarantees to detect whether a given input is a
legitimate input or not, but there is no guarantee on the accuracy
of the output when the input is adversarial.
Song et al. [27] proposed an approach of image purification
named PixelDefend to defend against adversarial examples. Pix-
elDefend requires no knowledge of the attack approach nor the
target model, but uses the PixelCNN model for its state-of-the-
art performance in modeling image distributions [18] to detect
an adversarial example. Then PixelDefend purifies the adversarial
example by searching for more probable images within a small dis-
tance of the adversarial example. Because PixelDefend only purifies
the given adversarial example, we can combine this approach with
MulDef to proceed with the purified example.
Tramer et al. [32] proposed another version of adversarial train-
ing, named Ensemble Adversarial Training, which augments the
training set with adversarial examples crafted from pre-trained
models. Our model generator also constructs each additional model
with the original training set augmented with adversarial exam-
ples generated from other previously constructed models in the
family. However, all the models in the family have the same archi-
tecture and parameter settings, whereas the pre-trained models in
Ensemble Adversarial Training can have different architectures or
parameter settings.
Zantedeschi et al. [34] proposed an approach to make the target
model more robust against adversarial examples by reinforcing the
model architecture so that its prediction becomes more stable. Their
approach uses the Bounded ReLU activation function for hedging
against the forward propagation of adversarial perturbation and
Gaussian data augmentation during training. Their approach is
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mainly for making the attack visually detectable. However, it still
does not perform well against C&W.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed MulDef, a defense approach
against adversarial examples for neural networks. Our approach
consists of (1) a general defense framework based on multiple mod-
els and (2) a technique for generating these multiple models to
achieve high defense capability. In particular, we construct a family
of models such that the models are complementary to each other to
accomplish robustness diversity. Our approach is simple, scalable,
and easy to be applied, because it does not modify the target model.
We evaluate our approach on three attack strategies (FGSM, C&W,
and PGD) for two datasets (MNIST and CIFAR-10). The evaluation
results show that our defense approach substantially improves the
target model’s adversarial accuracy by 22–74% in the white-box
attack scenario against both attack strategies and both datasets.
Even for the black-box attack scenario, our defense approach also
improves the target model’s adversarial accuracy by 2–10%. While
making the target model more robust against adversarial examples,
MulDef still maintains similar accuracy as the target model on
legitimate examples.
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A DATASETS
Here is the description of the two popular public datasets that we
use:
MNIST is a dataset of handwritten digits, consisting of ten labels
for the ten digits. We select 60,000 examples for the training set
and 10,000 examples for the test set. Each image is a 28x28 black
and white image.
CIFAR-10 is a widely used dataset consisting of 10 labels. We select
50,000 examples for the training set and 10,000 examples for the
test set. So there are 6,000 images per class. Each image is a 32x32
color image.
